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Abstract
Many countries are adopting policies to create greater coordination and integration between acute and long-term care services. 
This policy is predicated on the assumption that these service areas have interdependent outcomes for patients. In this paper, 
we study the interdependencies between the long-term (home care) services and consultations with a primary care doctor, 
as used by people over 75 years. Starting with a model of individual’s demand for doctor consultations, given supply, we 
formalize the hypothesis that exogenous increases to home care supply will reduce the number of consultations where these 
services are technical substitutes. Furthermore, greater coordination of public service planning and use of pooled budgets 
could lead to better outcomes because planners can account for these externalities. We test our main hypothesis using data 
from the British Household Panel Study for 1991–2009. To address potential concerns about endogeneity, we use a set of 
instrumental variables for home care motivated by institutional features of the social care system. We ind that there is a sta-
tistically signiicant substitution efect between home care and doctor visits, which is robust across a range of speciications. 
This result has implications for policies that consider increased coordination between health care and social care systems.
Keywords Substitution · Social care · Primary care · Older people
JEL Classiication I11 · I12 · I19
Introduction
In England and in a number of other countries, long-term 
care (LTC) systems are organised and funded separately 
from (acute) health services [1, 2]. Yet, the ageing of popula-
tions and changes in the complexity of health and care needs 
are calling these arrangements into question. For England, 
the Department of Health has projected that by 2026 there 
will be more than 6 million people aged over 75 years and 
by 2018 3 million people will have three or more long-term 
conditions, whether physical, mental or both [3]. Similar 
ageing patterns are predicted in many other countries. Older 
people are heavy users of health and LTC services, account-
ing for the largest part of the total health and long-term 
(social) care spending in England [3]. In this context, con-
cern has been raised about the problems of separate systems, 
not least the duplication of services, delays in the provision 
of care, failure to prevent onset of needs and patient dissatis-
faction [4]. More generally, a range of barriers (administra-
tive, inancial and cultural) have been identiied that limit 
the coordination of the two sectors [5–7].
In recent years, a range of normative policy arguments 
have been made that better integration and coordination of 
care can address these challenges and lead to better out-
comes [4]. Some permissive policies have also been put in 
place, although in practice, there appears to have been little 
actual coordination activity [8]. More recently, a ‘shared 
commitment’ to integrated care and support was agreed [4] 
following a White Paper, Caring for our future, published in 
2012 [9]. A number of local areas were selected as Integra-
tion Pioneers to explore mechanisms for more coordinated 
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working. The provisions for greater integration were laid 
out in the 2014 Care Act for England, with the subsequent 
requirement for all local health and social care economies 
to pool some budgets and develop local plans. This ‘Better 
Care Fund’ was implemented from April 2015 and involved 
around £5.3 bn of identiied funding.
Despite integration being at the centre of the policy 
debate, this position is supported by a limited evidence 
base. The modest and tentative literature around this issue 
has focused primarily on the impact of better coordination 
between LTC and hospital services, addressing mostly the 
issue of delayed hospital discharge or avoidable admissions 
to hospitals, with mixed results [10–14]. We contend that 
the evidence base for integration between primary care and 
social care is less researched.
Ideally, the evidence would be developed with compara-
tive trials of more integrated systems compared to current 
arrangements. A national evaluation of the integration 
pioneers has been commissioned but is not expected to 
report until June 2020.1 Moreover, such studies face sig-
niicant challenges in addressing attribution (selection) in 
non-randomised designs and in having suiciently compre-
hensive outcome measures [15, 16]. In this paper, we adopt 
a more pragmatic approach. The overall aim is to provide 
results about the scale of interdependence between the use 
of community-based LTC and primary care (GP) services, 
where the extent of interdependence is highly indicative of 
the potential for greater coordination (than the current low 
level) to improve the eiciency of resource allocation.
Coordination and pooling of budgets
There are many forms of ‘integration’ policy regarding pub-
lic services. In this paper, we are largely concerned with 
‘coordinated commissioning’ whereby the full range of 
health and care services are funded from a single, pooled 
budget and where, potentially, there is an alignment of incen-
tives (e.g. through single accountability mechanisms). Coor-
dination can occur at a system level, e.g. as with the Better 
Care Fund, or at an individual person level. An example of 
the latter is the policy of integrated personal commissioning 
(IPCs) [17]. At a system level, service needs are organised 
by multi-disciplinary commissioning teams (potentially 
teams comprising consultants, GPs, nurses and social work-
ers), drawing on a pooled budget. An example would be a 
coordinated service for people with multi-morbidity, work-
ing out of a GP practice using a capitated (pooled) budget.
Rationale for greater coordination
Two main policy rationales to implement policies that cre-
ate greater coordination are: (i) those which better internal-
ise preventative (externality) efects between the LTC and 
health systems, and (ii) those which help to correct prevail-
ing sub-optimal allocation of funding between the systems.
The prevention argument is predicated on there being an 
interdependence in the way that health and LTC services 
produce utility (or well-being). We define interdepend-
ence as occurring where the use of one service type by an 
individual changes the marginal efectiveness of the other 
service for that individual. For example, LTC could reduce 
the health-related needs of the patient through improved 
nutrition, hydration, mobility, medicine management and 
social contact, helping to reduce the risk of falls, infec-
tions, depression, etc. [11]. LTC can also help people with 
social and emotional needs, which can also afect health-
related quality of life (as well as care-related quality of life) 
[18]. Similarly, health care interventions could reduce care 
needs—e.g. from hip replacements to restore mobility, pain 
relief for arthritis, improved functioning from mitigation of 
COPD symptoms, etc.—which reduces the beneits/efec-
tiveness of using LTC. Furthermore, where one service pro-
duces assessment and diagnosis information (and shares it), 
this reduces the need (and so marginal efectiveness) of the 
other service in producing that information.2
Taking a system level perspective, these preventative 
efects create externalities between sectors. For example, 
more LTC helps people manage their chronic conditions 
better, so reducing the need for hospital admissions or GP 
consultations. Another example is where greater provision 
of LTC allows more timely transfers of care, reducing the 
need for as many hospital beds or GP appointment slots. 
Coordination of decision-making between health and social 
care could allow better internalisation of these externalities.
A second rationale is that more integrated decision-mak-
ing can help tackle any sub-optimal allocation of funding 
between health and social care that has arisen due to a lack 
of coordination historically. In particular, without coordina-
tion, public funding need not be allocated so that the mar-
ginal utility of service users that accrues to the last £1 spent 
on each service area is equal. Similarly, taking an extra-
welfarist perspective, the two sectors might not be operat-
ing with the same opportunity cost thresholds for equivalent 
incremental improvements in equivalent QALY beneits. 
1 http://www.piru.ac.uk/asset s/files /Integ rated %20Car e%20Pio 
neers %20Eva luati on%20%20201 5-2020-%20one %20pag e%20sum 
mary%20PIR U%2015%20Oct %2015.pdf.
2 Potentially, there could be a countervailing efect whereby diagnos-
tic/assessment information produced by one sector could help better 
target services in the other sector, given a positive cross-sector efect 
on marginal efectiveness. In any case, however, these are examples 
of interdependent efects.
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This rationale does not require any technical interdepend-
ence (no preventative efects) between service areas, just 
marginal diminishing utility. However, it is also more of a 
strategic (public) funding issue, and does not necessarily 
require coordination at the ‘delivery’ level.
Any comprehensive evaluation of whether greater coor-
dination and pooling of budgets is actually cost-efective is 
beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we focus on the nec-
essary condition that predicates the externalities argument 
made above, namely, that LTC and GP services are interde-
pendent. If service areas were entirely independent (for our 
target population), then the case for coordination—certainly 
at the operational, delivery level—is largely undermined.
We can explore this hypothesis empirically by estimating 
whether the use of LTC by an individual has a causal impact 
on their utilisation of GP services. Because GP services are 
free (at the point of use) in England, exogenous shocks that 
afect the price of LTC services should not lead to changes 
in demand for GP services from individuals that result from 
relative price efects that work through the budget constraint 
(because with zero prices for GP services, these decisions 
are not budget constrained). Rather, such LTC price shocks 
would (only) work through the GP demand if service uti-
lisation was interdependent in the utility function, that is, 
where the marginal utility of GP services is afected by the 
utilisation of LTC (and vice versa). Conversely, inding no 
causal efect would suggest that there was no utility inter-
dependence, which in turn would mean that preventative 
efects did not exist.
GP services of course have a cost to the public purse 
and public commissioners inluence the supply (capacity) 
of GP services, so constraining demand. Moreover, a fully 
coordinated public commissioner (with responsibility for 
both services and with a uniied budget) would react to price 
shocks. But, if the system is currently separately operated, 
and this is what we assume as a starting point, then GP ser-
vice funders would not react to price changes in the LTC sys-
tem, and vice versa. Potentially, coincidental shocks might 
show apparent interdependence in the use of GP services 
and LTC. As a result, and more generally to address causa-
tion issues (e.g. omitted variables), we used an instrumental 
variable approach to assess the efects of LTC on GP service 
utilisation.
Where preventative/externality efects exist, the imple-
mentation of more coordinated commissioning policies 
should generate greater utility/well-being in the population 
through the internalisation of these externalities, other things 
equal (unless by chance services happen to be already uti-
lised at the jointly optimised level). We cannot quantify the 
net beneits of such a policy reform (without specifying a 
social welfare function), but we might expect the potential 
beneit to be proportional to the degree of interdependence. 
In other words, if LTC and GP services show only negligible 
or no overlap, policies to coordinate public commission-
ing decisions regarding these services would have limited 
impact. Alternatively, if the interdependence between ser-
vices is signiicant, the opportunities for such policies to be 
cost-efective are correspondingly greater.
Potentially, long-term care could be provided by infor-
mal carers as well as former service providers. There is an 
extensive literature on the interplay between formal services 
(health and care) and informal care [19, 20]. The empirical 
focus of this paper is on formal care services—speciically 
those provided in the community. Nonetheless, the concep-
tual arguments would apply to informally provided LTC in 
afecting demand for GP services, namely, that shocks to 
informal care supply would only afect demand for GP ser-
vices if their impact on utility is interdependent. Policies 
that afect informal care might be diferently conigured if a 
coordinated approach rather than separate decision-making 
was implemented.
Aims and structure
Drawing together the above arguments, the paper has two 
aims. The irst is in regard to the hypothesis that LTC and 
health services are interdependent. In particular, we aim to 
assess whether the use of community-based LTC services 
reduces the utilisation of GP services, other things equal. 
The second aim is to interpret this inding in terms of the 
case for implementing more coordinated commissioning 
between GP and LTC services.
Conceptual framework
Individual‑level decisions
We begin by considering individuals’ demand for doctor 




 denotes the use of health care—in this case, con-
sultations with a doctor—and yi is the use of long-term care. 
As noted above, LTC, yi , in this case could be provided by 
informal carers as well as former service providers. A sepa-
rate treatment of formal and informal care would involve 
trade-ofs between these areas, as well as with (formal) 
health services. We concentrate on potential substitution 
between care and health services, assuming that at least part 
of the utilisation yi comprises formal care services.
Consumption of other goods, services and leisure activi-
ties is given by m
i
 . We assume that doctor consultations, 
whilst having a positive impact on health and so utility 
(1)Ui = ui(xi, yi;휎i) + ei(xi; 휎i) + vi(mi).
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(through the function u
i
 ), can also have a negative efect, 
perhaps through the efort of visiting a doctor, or in terms 
of the waiting times to see a doctor. This efect, which we 
call efort for shorthand, is denoted by e
i
 in the utility func-
tion. We also assume LTC services have a positive beneit, 
producing well-being.
A range of risk factors and other need variables act as 
parameters of Eq. (1), as denoted by 휎
i
 . These would include 
the severity of the person’s condition, but also other related 
factors such as health literacy. Finally, utility accrues to 
other consumption as determined by the function v
i
.
We assume that all elements of the utility function 
embody diminishing marginal utility, i.e. u′ > 0, u′′ < 0 
and v′ > 0, v′′ < 0 . The efort associated with accessing 
health care produces negative utility, and increasingly so 
with health care use: e′ < 0 and e′′ < 0.
Individuals have a budget constraint of: Bi = piyi + mi , 
where pi is the (generally subsidised) price of LTC paid by 
client.
In practice, it will be diicult for people to determine 
optimal service use, but through inluence by professionals 
and from experience, we assume that behaviour approxi-
mates the optimal. Solving Eq. (1) gives optimal utilisation 
as functions of the exogenous variables. For health and LTC 











(pi, Bi, 휎i) , 
respectively.
Assessing the comparative statics results of an exogenous 
shock that leads to an increase in the price of LTC services 
( pi ) using Cramer’s rule, we ind that GP service demand is 




> 0 , if services are interdependent as 
substitutes, i.e. if u
xy
< 0.3 Conversely, if services are inde-
pendent, i.e. u
xy




= 0 . These results arise because GP service has zero 
price and so does not enter the budget constraint. Moreover, 
we assume that there is no binding ‘time’ constraint (since 
GP consultations and home care visits take a relatively short 
time). These results underpin our main empirical 
hypothesis.
Implications for planning services
Where the efects of LTC and health services are interde-
pendent, then we might expect coordinated decision-making 
in the public care system to produce better outcomes than 
separate decision-making between LTC and health care sys-
tems for a number of reasons.
The main argument is that interdependence implies 
externalities and these should be accounted for in resource 
allocation decisions. We can make the salient points regard-
ing the implications of policies to better integrate or coor-
dinate care by using two representative decision-makers 
(DMs): for health care (the GP, denoted by H) and for LTC 
(a care manager, or L). Decisions are made about the avail-
ability of services and the eligibility of patients or clients. 
Without loss of generality, suppose there are two service 
users, one with relatively straightforward needs ( i = A ), and 
one with complex needs ( i = B ). In the former case, exter-
nalities efects are smaller than with the latter.
Suppose the objective function for the health DM (H) is:
and for the LTC DM (L):
where h is the health-related quality of life of the individual, 
and w is their care-related quality of life, such that h′ > 0 , 
h
′′
< 0 , w′ > 0 and w′′ < 0 . In these functions, xP is the 
planned level of health care utilisation for the patient/client 
and yP is LTC utilisation. Through the agency relationship 
with the patient/client [21, 22], the care professional aims 
for the client/patient to use planned level of care, relect-
ing their preferences embodied in u
i
 in Eq. (1). Actual use 
will difer from planned use in practice, especially if service 
prices (monetary and otherwise) are subsidised. It suices 
that planned supply will be positively correlated with actual 
utilisation. We assume that if there are interdependencies 
between x
i
 and yi then we can expect similar interdependen-




 in the DM’s 
objective function (which follows if the individual’s utility 
is nested in the DM’s objective function).
A standard externality result is that decisions taken that 
account for external efects, that is coordinated decisions, 
will produce optimal resource allocations that are diferent 
from those allocations if decisions are taken independently. 
The coordinated decision-making (denoted PI) case is:




 are the unit costs 
of services. In this case, the costs of GP services are positive 






































































































































3 This result is established in the electronic supplementary material 
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Compared to separate decision-making, coordinated 
decision-making would (generally) produce a diferent allo-
cation both between service areas and between the two ser-















 where decisions are taken 
























, ∀y . The inter-
dependence in the individuals’ utility function (i.e. u
xy
≠ 0 ) 
is the basis for assumption. This is a standard externality 
problem whereby the internalisation of external beneits 
leads to a Pareto improvement (subject to transaction costs).
In the above case, a move to coordinated decision-mak-
ing produces a reallocation of resources because externality 
efects are internalised. However, coordination could also 
lead to a reallocation in the case where no externality efects 
existed because separately determined (global) budgets need 
not be set optimally, with account being made of the relative 
marginal beneits of additional public funding for both GP 
and LTC services (the second rationale as discussed in the 
introduction).4 In this case, we are referring to ‘coordination’ 
as being at the global or strategic level (in setting global 
budgets).
From a societal perspective, assuming the public system 
aimed to maximise both health and well-being (equally 
weighted in this case), the optimisation problem of the coor-
dinated decision-maker Eq. (4) also deines the socially opti-
mal allocation. Accordingly, the coordinated allocation is 
preferred to the separately determined allocation, subject to 
the net beneits outweighing any transaction costs of imple-
menting this new approach.
Current decision rules appear not to account for externali-
ties. If we ind evidence of interdependency of services in 
the individual’s utility function, i.e. if u
xy
≠ 0 , then we can 
infer that a more coordinated decision-making process could 
improve eiciency, as outlined above.
Empirical speciication




> 0 , is tested using an 
observational approach with survey data. We cannot directly 
observe the market price of care services, pi , as they afect 
person i . Rather, we exploit the assumptions that person i is 
a price taker in local market k (i.e. pi∈k or pk for short is also 








 , solving Eq. (1) subject to the budget 
constraint.
Individuals’ decisions about use of care services will also 
be positively correlated with exogenous supply factors in 
local markets, via the change in price that they face. Accord-
ingly, the efects of a change in price due to exogenous 
shocks is relected in the change in the amount of care that 
the person uses following a price change that results from 
the shock, other things equal. We can also solve for a partial 
reduced-form function for care services for any given value 
of GP service use: ŷi = ŷi(pk, Bi, �i; xi) . As individuals are 
price takers, we can assume 
�ŷi(xi)
�pk
< 0 , i.e. service demand 
is inversely related to price, other things equal. As a function 
of given x
i
 and exogenous variables, we can invert this func-













 . We cannot directly observe ŷi , but this 
variable can be predicted using data on yi and an instrumen-
tal variable, Z
i
 (that is not a function of x
i
 ) in a irst-stage 




+ 휇i (i.e. ŷi = yi 
setting 휇
i







 is supported 











< 0 as we assume that 
�ŷi
�pi
< 0 . 
In other words, price is negatively correlated with ŷi and 
positively correlated with x
i
 by hypothesis.
Instrumenting in this way also help address any endoge-





 . People with high risk/need factors are more likely to 
use both doctor and LTC services than those with low need 
levels. Using an IV approach, ŷi should not be correlated 
with any omitted control factors which instead appear in 
the error term.
As an instrument, we constructed a ‘spatial lag’ variable: 
ȳj≠i∈Lj =
∑
j≠i yj∈Li∕nLi , that is, for each person i , we calcu-
late the average LTC use by respondents in our data in the 
person’s local region, L
i
 , excluding that person’s own use of 
services. The idea is that other people’s average use of LTC 
services in the same local (regional) market will be corre-
lated with person i ’s use of services due to common supply 
and local authority policy factors in that market. At the same 
time, other people’s average regional use of LTC services 
should not have any direct efect on an individual person i ’s 
decision to visit a GP.





= xi(ŷi, Bi, �i),
(8)Vit = a + 훽1HHit + X
�
it
훽2 + 훽3Ti + ui + 휀it,
















4 See electronic supplementary material 2 for more details.




 is the number of GP visits and HH
it
 is the use of home 
help of individual i in year t. X
′
it
 is a vector of individual 
characteristics that are expected to afect demand such as 
demographic and needs factors as well as a dummy for liv-
ing in London to relect the particular circumstances of the 
capital, not least the high supply price of services. T
i
 is a 
year dummy, u
i
 are individual unobserved efects. Z
it
 is the 
instrumental variable, in our case the average home help use 
in individual’s i local region, L
i





 are zero-mean error terms.
Data
Data and variables
Data for England is taken from the British Household Panel 
Survey (BHPS), for the years 1991–2009. The BHPS is one 
of the main longitudinal surveys for studying social issues 
in Britain. It comprises a nationally representative sample of 
around 5000 households and 10,000 individuals recruited in 
1991 and re-interviewed each year until 2009. If individuals 
split of from original households to form new households, 
they are followed and all adult members of these house-
holds are also interviewed. Similarly, new members join-
ing sample households become eligible for interview and 
children are interviewed as they reach the age of 16 years. 
The questionnaire includes items that span a large number 
of areas including among others socioeconomic structure, 
family structure, wealth, consumption, the labour market, 
health and well-being.
The BHPS has information on both GP and LTC utilisa-
tion. In terms of GP utilisation, the survey asks the respond-
ents to report the number of GP consultations they had in 
the previous year; these are recorded as a categorical vari-
able and respondents can choose between ive categories: 
zero, one to two, three to ive, six to ten and ten or more. 
In the analysis, we both use the variable as a categorical 
one and also convert it into a ‘pseudo-continuous’ format 
to estimate the size of the substitution efects using the 
midpoint of each category for that purpose. As estimation 
results could be potentially sensitive to replacement values 
for the open-ended top category, we triangulated with other 
datasets. (Unpublished) analysis of administrative data on 
GP consultations by over 75 s in a locality in England sug-
gested that consultation rates of ten or more averaged about 
20 consultations per year and we therefore used this value.
With regard to LTC utilisation, BHPS records informa-
tion about the use of home help. In particular, respondents 
are asked whether they used home help in the previous year 
and they respond with a yes or no.
A number of need factors and demographic characteris-
tics are included as control variables in the analysis. These 
include gender, age, marital status, number of limitations 
with activities of daily living (ADL),6 subjective health sta-
tus, smoking status, problems with sight, hearing, arm or 
leg, skin, breathing, stomach, diabetes, anxiety, alcohol and 
drugs, epilepsy, migraine, heart, blood and others. We also 
control for a London dummy and year dummies.
Since the oldest in the population are more likely to be the 
heaviest users of both primary care and home help services, 
the sample was restricted to people aged 75 years and over. 
There were a few missing values in the number of GP visits, 
smoking status and ADL limitations questions. However, 
when ADL count was the same in the years before and after 
the year with missing ADL count, this was replaced with 
Table 1  Number of GP consultations in the last year





All people 75 + 10,177
 0 0 1397 13.73
 1–2 1.5 3123 30.69
 3–5 4 2894 28.44
 6–10 8 1515 14.89
 10 + 20 1248 12.26





People 75 + years using home help 1282 12.60
 Mean 7.17
 SD 7.04





6 ADLs consist of doing housework, climbing stairs, getting dressed, 
walking for more than 10 min or other.
5 Our data records as geographic information the standard regions 
distinguishing former Metropolitan Counties and Inner and Outer 
London. Therefore, the local regions at which the instrument is 
constructed are the following: rest of South East, South West, East 
Anglia, East Midlands, West Midlands Conurbation, rest of West 
Midlands, Greater Manchester, Merseyside, rest of North West, South 
Yorkshire, West Yorkshire, rest of Yorks and Humberside, Tyne and 
Wear, rest of North. Inner and Outer London are collapsed into one 
category.
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the value from the adjacent waves.7 The inal sample size is 
10,177 observations.
Descriptive statistics
Table 1 shows the distribution of the number of GP vis-
its. On average, respondents had around ive GP visits in 
the previous year. Approximately, 86% of the sample had 
at least one GP visit in the previous year and 14% reported 
no visit. Around 13% of the sample used home help in the 
previous year. Those using home help reported on average a 
higher number of GP visits (seven visits) compared to those 
not using home help in the previous year (ive visits). Thus, 
we see that in the raw data there is a positive correlation 
between GP visits and home help use. This correlation is 
likely to be a result of endogeneity driven by simultaneity 
and omitted variables. In the empirical analysis, we control 
for a number of confounding factors and use an instrumental 
variables approach to overcome this issue.
Table 2 presents the sample descriptive statistics. Approx-
imately, 61% of the sample consists of women and the aver-
age age is 81 years. 38% of the sample report being married 
and a 10% are smokers. The majority do not report any ADL 
limitation (61%). Of the other 39% that reported at least one 
ADL limitation, most reported only one limitation (12.8% 
of the sample). Hearing, arm/leg, and heart/blood problems 
Table 2  Descriptive statistics
BHPS data; years 1991–2009; England only; age 75 years and above
N Mean SD Min Max
Service use
 GP visits (categorical) 10,177 2.81 1.21 1 5
 GP visits (pseudo-continuous) 10,177 5.24 6.03 0 20
 Home help 10,177 0.13 0.33 0 1
Personal characteristics
 Female 10,177 0.61 0.49 0 1
 Age 10,177 80.7 4.55 75 100
 Married 10,177 0.38 0.49 0 1
 Smoker 10,177 0.10 0.30 0 1
Health condition/impairment
 ADL count 10,177 0.82 1.27 0 4
 Sight 10,177 0.20 0.40 0 1
 Hearing 10,177 0.32 0.47 0 1
 Arm/leg/hand 10,177 0.60 0.49 0 1
 Heart/blood 10,177 0.45 0.50 0 1
 Skin 10,177 0.09 0.29 0 1
 Breathing 10,177 0.20 0.40 0 1
 Stomach 10,177 0.12 0.33 0 1
 Diabetes 10,177 0.09 0.29 0 1
 Anxiety/depression 10,177 0.09 0.29 0 1
 Alcohol/drugs 10,177 0.00 0.03 0 1
 Epilepsy 10,177 0.00 0.06 0 1
 Migraine 10,177 0.04 0.21 0 1
 Other 10,177 0.07 0.26 0 1
Health over the last 12 months
 Excellent/good 10,177 0.53 0.50 0 1
 Fair 10,177 0.31 0.46 0 1
 Poor/very poor 10,177 0.16 0.36 0 1
Region
 London 10,177 0.09 0.29 0 1
Instrument
 Average home help use by 
region
10,177 0.13 0.04 0.06 0.20
Table 3  First-stage results
Pooled 2sls model. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Statistics robust 
to heteroskedasticity and clustering on individual level. Reference 
category: excellent/good health
Home help
Spatial lag 0.681*** (0.142)
Female 0.019* (0.011)
Age − 0.025 (0.039)
Age squared 0.0002 (0.0002)
Married − 0.070*** (0.010)
ADL count 0.040*** (0.013)
ADL count squared 0.004 (0.004)
Health: fair 0.017* (0.009)
Health: poor/very poor 0.080*** (0.017)
Smoker − 0.030** (0.015)
Sight problem 0.035** (0.014)
Hearing problem 0.003 (0.011)
Arm/leg/hand problem 0.012 (0.008)
Skin problem 0.024 (0.016)
Breathing problem 0.004 (0.013)
Stomach problem 0.024 (0.015)
Diabetes problem − 0.027* (0.016)
Anxiety/depression problem 0.018 (0.016)
Alcohol/drugs problem 0.014 (0.112)
Epilepsy problem − 0.041 (0.042)
Migraine problem 0.010 (0.023)
Other problem 0.004 (0.016)
Heart blood problem 0.013 (0.009)
London region 0.005 (0.019)
Constant 0.477 (1.573)
Year dummies Yes
K-P rk LM statistic [chi-sq(1)] (under-id) 22.09***
Anderson-Rubin Wald test [chi-sq(1)] (weak-id) 8.47***
Observations 10,177
7 The results did not change when we did not account for the missing 
values in this way.
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are the most common ones. The majority report an excellent 
or good subjective health status (53%).
Results
Primary indings
Our identiication strategy relies primarily on the use of the 
‘spatial lag’ as an instrument. We therefore need to test for 
instrument relevance and validity for our empirical analysis 
to be robust. Table 3 presents the irst-stage results of the IV 
model. The instrument is a strong predictor of the endog-
enous variable in the irst stage. The coeicient is positive 
and signiicant at the 1% level. The underidentiication test 
(Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic) rejects the null hypoth-
esis indicating that the model is identiied and the excluded 
instrument is relevant. Furthermore, a weak identiication 
test (Anderson–Rubin Wald test) rejects the null hypothesis 
that the coeicients of the excluded instruments are jointly 
equal to zero, suggesting that our instrument is strongly cor-
related with the endogenous variable. Overall, we are con-
ident that the ‘spatial lag’ variable works well in the irst 
stage. We cannot directly test the validity of the instrument, 
but following the literature we assess whether the instrument 
is balanced with respect to the needs-related characteris-
tics of service users [23]. In particular, we split the sample 
into two groups: those with the instrument above and those 
below its median value (Table 4). Finding no diference in 
the mean value of each covariate between groups would pro-
vide some reassurance that the instrument is not directly cor-
related with the dependent variable (in a way that we cannot 
control for). We calculated the standardised mean diference 
for each variable between the two groups. Some variables 
showed a diference of above 0.1 (e.g. ADL count, smoker, 
good health status), but overall the covariates were reason-
ably balanced. Accordingly, we had reasonable conidence 
that the instrument was not systematically correlated with 
the GP service use dependent variable by some unobserved 
process (where clearly we were controlling for any direct 
Table 4  Individual-level 
characteristics by regional home 
help utilisation
Balance tests compare for systematic diferences in the control variables between the ‘treated’ and ‘control’ 
groups (here, above and below the IV median)
All IV below the 
median




Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Personal characteristics
 Female 0.61 0.49 0.59 0.49 0.62 0.48 − 0.06
 Age 80.70 4.55 80.71 4.60 80.70 4.49 0.00
 Married 0.38 0.49 0.40 0.49 0.36 0.48 0.09
 Smoker 0.10 0.30 0.08 0.27 0.12 0.33 − 0.16
Health conditions/impairments
 ADL count 0.82 1.27 0.74 1.23 0.92 1.31 − 0.14
 Sight 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.19 0.39 0.03
 Hearing 0.32 0.47 0.31 0.46 0.33 0.47 − 0.04
 Arm/leg/hand 0.60 0.49 0.58 0.49 0.62 0.48 − 0.08
 Skin 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.28 0.01
 Breathing 0.20 0.40 0.18 0.38 0.22 0.41 − 0.11
 Stomach 0.12 0.33 0.11 0.31 0.14 0.35 − 0.09
 Diabetes 0.09 0.29 0.10 0.30 0.08 0.27 0.05
 Anxiety/depression 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.28 0.10 0.30 − 0.05
 Alcohol/drugs 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.04 − 0.01
 Epilepsy 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.06 − 0.02
 Migraine 0.04 0.21 0.05 0.21 0.04 0.20 0.02
 Other 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.25 0.03
 Heart blood 0.45 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.43 0.49 0.08
Subjective health status
 Excellent/good 0.53 0.50 0.56 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.12
 Fair 0.31 0.46 0.30 0.46 0.33 0.47 − 0.06
 Poor/very poor 0.16 0.36 0.14 0.35 0.17 0.38 − 0.09
N 10,177 5646 4531
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efect from the included covariates). In “Robustness tests”, 
we investigate this further by controlling for north, south or 
midlands dummies as well as a similarly constructed spatial 
lag variable for the number of doctor visits.
With regard to the main estimation, four estimators 
were used: a pooled 2sls model, a random efects ordered 
probit model, a random efects model (both with manu-
ally instrumented home help use) and a random efects 
IV model. Standard errors were clustered at the indi-
vidual level to account for repeated observations, and 
bootstrapped in the random efects IV model. Random 
efects are at the individual level. The main model of ref-
erence is the random efects ordered probit so as not to 
impose additional assumptions on the distribution of the 
dependent variable. The other models are presented for 
comparison as well as a way to test the sensitivity of the 
results to the estimator used. While the use of the random 
efects estimators requires the additional assumption that 
individual efects are uncorrelated with the explanatory 
variables compared to a ixed efects model, a Hausman 
Table 5  Efect of using home help on the number of GP consultations
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Clustered standard errors at the individual level (models 1, 2, 3) and bootstrapped standard errors (model 4) in 
parentheses. Reference category: excellent/good health. Excluded instrument: average regional home help use excluding own utilisation. Manu-
ally instrumented home help use (models 2 and 3)
Pooled 2sls (1) RE ordered probit (2) Random efects (3) IV random efects (4)
Home help − 9.359** (3.759) − 1.563* (0.823) − 6.591** (3.263) − 10.670* (6.137)
Female 0.241 (0.235) 0.085 (0.052) 0.236 (0.200) 0.502* (0.301)
Age − 0.433 (0.589) − 0.018 (0.106) − 0.144 (0.431) − 0.432 (0.621)
Age squared 0.003 (0.004) 0.0001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.003) 0.003 (0.004)
Married − 0.604* (0.341) − 0.041 (0.073) − 0.363 (0.287) − 0.370 (0.269)
ADL count 1.281*** (0.296) 0.227*** (0.053) 1.030*** (0.238) 1.108*** (0.236)
ADL count squared − 0.133* (0.076) − 0.024* (0.012) − 0.081 (0.058) − 0.099** (0.045)
Health: fair 1.936*** (0.192) 0.545*** (0.036) 1.901*** (0.148) 1.850*** (0.168)
Health: poor/very poor 5.286*** (0.447) 1.097*** (0.085) 4.661*** (0.367) 4.766*** (0.621)
Smoker − 1.267*** (0.331) − 0.331*** (0.073) − 0.939*** (0.272) − 0.992*** (0.291)
Sight problem 0.449 (0.278) 0.095* (0.050) 0.275 (0.208) 0.198 (0.158)
Hearing problem 0.093 (0.198) 0.047 (0.035) − 0.005 (0.149) 0.051 (0.174)
Arm/leg/hand problem 0.570*** (0.169) 0.191*** (0.034) 0.426*** (0.131) 0.480*** (0.176)
Skin problem 0.828*** (0.319) 0.155*** (0.054) 0.641*** (0.238) 0.621** (0.308)
Breathing problem 1.230*** (0.256) 0.221*** (0.040) 0.759*** (0.178) 0.642*** (0.185)
Stomach problem 0.938*** (0.307) 0.206*** (0.049) 0.531** (0.220) 0.351 (0.299)
Diabetes problem 0.659* (0.353) 0.189*** (0.073) 0.610* (0.339) 0.551 (0.349)
Anxiety/depression problem 1.081*** (0.354) 0.252*** (0.053) 0.940*** (0.258) 0.945*** (0.299)
Alcohol/drugs problem 1.061 (1.620) − 0.204 (0.515) − 1.271 (2.294) − 0.672 (3.355)
Epilepsy problem − 0.364 (1.135) 0.150 (0.253) 0.484 (1.288) 1.048 (1.150)
Migraine problem − 0.169 (0.456) 0.016 (0.073) 0.005 (0.326) 0.155 (0.388)
Other problem 0.981*** (0.321) 0.162*** (0.054) 0.621** (0.246) 0.634** (0.268)
Heart blood problem 1.868*** (0.184) 0.386*** (0.033) 1.290*** (0.140) 1.138*** (0.158)
London region − 0.149 (0.369) − 0.074 (0.079) − 0.221 (0.306) − 0.097 (0.282)
Constant 17.040 (23.900) 8.010 (17.650) 18.050 (23.830)
Cut points
 1 − 1.479 (4.353)
 2 − 0.118 (4.354)
 3 0.977 (4.355)
 4 1.795 (4.356)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10,177 10,177 10,177 10,177
Under-id (K-P rk LM statistic) [Chi-sq(1)] 22.09***
Weak-id (K-P rk Wald F statistic/ F-stat) 22.98*** 86.18*** 86.18*** 86.18***
Endogeneity (Durbin–Wu–Hausman statistic) 
[Chi-sq(1)]
9.19*** 5.31* 4.66* 4.66*
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test (13.20) for the choice between the two models failed 
to reject the null hypothesis providing support for the use 
of a random efects estimator which is more eicient.
Table 5 presents the primary estimation results. There 
was evidence of endogeneity of the home help variable as 
expected. The results from all four models provided sup-
port for our main hypothesis. Home help use has a statisti-
cally signiicant and negative efect on the number of GP 
consultations (contrasting with the raw correlation of these 
variables). Table 6 and Fig. 1 present the estimated mar-
ginal efects of home help use on the probability of being in 
each of the GP visits categories (using the random efects 
ordered probit model results). We see that using home help 
signiicantly increases the probability of being in the low-
frequency categories (0 or 1–2 consultations) and signii-
cantly lowers the probability of being in the high-frequency 
categories (3–5, 6–10, 10 + consultations). Applying mid-
point notional values (as listed in the table) the average 
marginal efect of having used home help was on average 
a 5.5 reduction in GP visits in the year. The models using 
the pseudo-continuous variable tended to produce slightly 
higher marginal efects (of − 6.6 to − 10.7).
As regards the other control variables, health and needs 
variables were strong predictors of the number of GP visits. 
A higher ADL limitations count was statistically signiicant 
and led to a higher number of GP visits. Similarly, having 
problems with arm or leg, skin, breathing, diabetes, anxiety 
and heart or blood had a positive and statistically signiicant 
efect on the number of GP visits. Subjective health sta-
tus was also signiicant with those reporting fair and poor 
health having a higher number of visits compared to those 
reporting good health. Being a smoker was associated with a 
smaller number of GP visits, which was somewhat contrary 
to expectations but could relect risk-taking behaviour as 
opposed to a needs factor.
We might expect that the preventative efects of home 
help use are stronger for people with higher condition sever-
ity 휎
i
 and consequently higher need for long-term care com-
pared to people with low risk. Existing evidence suggests 
that LTC services have a greater efect on well-being for 
people with high levels of need rather than low levels [11, 
24]. This result stems from people having a greater capacity 
to beneit from services if they have greater levels of impair-
ment [25, 26].
The size of the substitution efect can also be expressed 






 ). Assuming a unit cost of £46 per GP 
consultation ( ̄c
x
 ) and £150 per week or £7,800 per year for 
home help (c̄
y
) , using national unit cost igures [27], the 
results show that every extra £1 spent on home help services 
will generate a reduction in demand for GP services equiva-
lent to approximately £0.03 per annum on average (using the 
ordered probit results).
Robustness tests
As robustness tests, we controlled for additional covari-
ates to exclude possible correlation of the instrument with 
demand, and estimated diferent instrument speciications.
All the results are reported in Table 7. First, we estimated 
a model with the spatial lag square as an additional instru-
ment (Table 7; column 1). The Hansen J statistic showed 
no problem with overidentiication restrictions. Secondly, 
we estimated a model with further income-related proxies, 
speciically a dummy for home ownership and a dummy 
for whether the respondents receive attendance allowance 
(Table 7; column 2). The third variant added controls for 
regional diferences to the main model, speciically dum-
mies for north, midlands and south of England (Table 7; col-
umn 3) and a spatially lagged number of GP visits (Table 7; 
column 4). In these speciications, the results regarding the 
efect of home help do not substantially change in terms of 
sign or magnitude. In addition, the efect of home ownership, 
Table 6  Conditional marginal efect of home help on the probability 
of each outcome (random efects ordered probit)






Outcome 1: none 0.24 − 0.01 0.48 0
Outcome 2: one to 
two
0.20 − 0.01 0.40 1.5
Outcome 3: three to 
ive
− 0.07 − 0.15 0.00 4
Outcome 4: six to ten − 0.15 − 0.30 0.00 8
Outcome 5: more 
than ten



















None One to two Three to five Six to ten Ten plus
Doctor consultations per year
Fig. 1  Average marginal efects of home help (predicted) with 95% 
CIs
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attendance allowance receipt or spatially lagged GP visits 
was not statistically signiicant, while only the south dummy 
was signiicant compared to the north dummy.8 Furthermore, 
since subjective health status can be seen as an outcome 
itself, we estimated a model excluding it from the controls 
list (Table 7; column 5). Again, the efect of home help did 
not substantially change while the diagnostic tests gave the 
expected results. Lastly, we test for whether the use of other 
services can afect the relationship under study. We do not 
have data on the use of all other possible services, but from 
BHPS we control for whether individuals had a district nurse 
or health visitor visit in the last year. We see that although 
the efect of seeing a district nurse has a positive signiicant 
efect on the number of GP visits, the impact of using home 
help does not change in terms of size, sign or signiicance.
Discussion
There is considerable policy interest in the better integra-
tion of long-term care with primary and secondary care, 
especially in England where long-term care is mostly the 
responsibility of local government rather than the National 
Health Service. In this paper, we developed a conceptual 
framework with a number of theoretical hypotheses which 
were investigated using data from the BHPS (1991–2009).
We found that (exogenously driven) changes in commu-
nity-based LTC service (home care) utilisation lead to nega-
tively related changes in the demand for GP consultations. 
Our main estimates indicated that using home care results in 
approximately ive fewer doctor (GP) consultations in a year.
This substitution efect corresponds to a £0.03 for an extra 
£1 spent on long-term care, which is relatively small since 
the cost of long-term care is incurred throughout the year 
and is high. Nonetheless, this efect estimate will likely be 
a lower bound of the overall substitution efect because it 
only accounts for the direct efect of home care on GP ser-
vice use. GP consultations often result in referrals, prescrip-
tion costs, etc., so we might assume that where a person has 
fewer GP consultations, this will be associated with fewer 
additional health costs of this nature.
Moreover, the results do not include any further beneits 
from externality efects created by greater coordination, e.g. 
from sharing of information through joint assessment, reduc-
tion in duplicated activity and so on [4].
These indings provide support for policies that seek to 
increase coordination between health and LTC systems, 
particularly with respect to primary care.Greater coordina-
tion in this case should improve eiciency through a more 
integrated resource allocation mechanism because, given 
the current low baseline of integrated decision-making, the 
spillover efects of decisions in one service area on the other 
Table 7  Efect of home help use on GP consultations, robustness tests
Model 1: Excluded instruments: spatial lag (regional average home help use excluding own use), spatial lag squared; other controls as in X
Model 2: Excluded instrument: spatial lag; other controls as in X and house ownership dummy and attendance allowance dummy
Model 3: Excluded instrument: spatial lag; other controls as in X and north/midlands/south dummies with north as the reference category
Model 4: Excluded instrument: spatial lag; other controls as in X and ‘spatial lag’ number of doctor visits
Model 5: Excluded instrument: spatial lag; other controls as in X, except for subjective health status dummies
Model 6: Excluded instrument: spatial lag; other controls as in X and use of district nurse or health visitor
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1; clustered standard errors at the individual level in parentheses; pooled 2sls estimator
1 2 3 4 5 6
Home help − 9.410** (3.740) − 9.153** (4.003) − 8.444** (4.087) − 9.104** (4.026) − 8.639** (3.761) − 9.868** (3.939)
GP visits (spatial lag) – – – 0.055 (0.288) – –
District nurse/ health 
visitor
– – – – – 1.490*** (0.451)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10,177 9,987 10,177 10,177 10,183 10,177
Weak-id (K-P rk Wald F 
statistic)




10.07*** 8.02*** 5.82** 7.91*** 8.19*** 9.38***
Overidentiication test 
(Hansen J statistic) 
[Chi-sq(1)]
0.43
8 Results are available upon request.
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are not factored into those decisions. The size of the substi-
tution efect gives us a sense of the scale of the eiciency 
improvement: larger efects (in absolute terms) suggest more 
scope of eiciency improvement. However, we cannot deter-
mine the size of any improvement in social welfare or how 
coordination should change resource allocation between the 
two sectors without (i) results regarding the main efects of 









 ) and (ii) a speciication of the social welfare function. 
We would need more information on the marginal beneit 
per £1 (or cost-efectiveness) being produced by health and 
LTC services, and on the transaction costs associated with 
implementing a more coordinated decision-making system. 
Furthermore, we would need to know whether, and how, 
a ‘coordinated’ system would work to achieve, or move 
towards, the optimal solution. Nonetheless, inding that sub-
stitution efects exist, as we do, establishes the case for an 
exploration of the net beneits of a more coordinated system.
Information on the incremental cost-effectiveness of 
health and care services is being estimated and collected by 
public agencies—such as the National Institute of Health 
and Care Excellence (NICE) in England—but the available 
evidence base is limited. A number of relevant care-related 
quality of life measures are available, such as EQ-5D [28] 
and ASCOT [26] and a recent paper by Stevens et al. [29] 
has established their relative value.
There were a number of empirical challenges in our anal-
ysis, which we should note. To begin with, there was the cat-
egorical nature of the dependent variable. Ordered probit as 
well as linear models (with the use of a pseudo-continuous 
variable for doctor visits) were used to establish the signii-
cance of the efect. The results were consistent with the main 
substitution hypothesis across this range of models indicat-
ing a statistically signiicant substitution efect between LTC 
use and primary care visits of similar magnitude.
A second challenge was the potential endogeneity in the 
LTC use and primary care relationship arising from unob-
served omitted variables and reverse causality. To address 
this issue we used an instrumental variables approach 
exploiting the spatial structure of the data. Overall, the 
instrument worked well, with diagnostic and specifica-
tion tests indicating that it is relevant and valid. However, 
given that the instrumental variable estimation is sensitive 
to assumptions, and the exclusion restriction assumption is 
not directly testable, we still need to be somewhat cautious 
with the results.
Also, in using a community-based survey, we were 
unable to assess the impact of residential care on doctor 
consultation rates. Potentially, the availability of care home 
services might inluence the relationship between commu-
nity-based social care and doctor consultation rates, which 
should be controlled for in the analysis. However, given the 
much greater prevalence of community-based rather than 
residential social care we do not consider this to be a sig-
niicant limitation.
In conclusion, this paper has contributed evidence of 
signiicant inter-relationships between primary care health 
services and LTC services for older people, albeit to a mod-
est degree. Historically, there has been little account of these 
interdependencies and negligible coordination between the 
two sectors. This analysis provides groundwork for policies 
that aim to create greater coordination.
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